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WHY A FEDERAL WEALTH TAX
IS CONSTITUTIONAL
ISSUE BRIEF BY ARI GLOGOWER, DAVID GAMAGE, AND KITTY RICHARDS
FEBRUARY 2021

INTRODUCTION
The 2020 Democratic presidential primaries brought national attention to a new
direction for the tax system: a federal wealth tax for the wealthiest taxpayers. During their
campaigns, Senators Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) and Bernie Sanders (I-VT) both introduced
proposals to tax the wealth of multimillionaires and billionaires, and to use the revenue
for public investments, including in health care and education. These reforms generated
broad public support—even among many Republicans1—and broadened the conversation
over the future of progressive tax reform.
A well-designed, high-end wealth tax can level the playing field in an unequal society and
promote shared economic prosperity.
Critics have argued, however, that a wealth tax would be unconstitutional because of
the Constitution’s apportionment rule, which requires certain taxes to be apportioned
among the states according to their populations. These critics advance maximalist
interpretations of the apportionment rule and reconstruct the rule as a significant limit
on Congress’s constitutional taxing power.
In response to these objections, this brief explains why these critics misinterpret the
role of the apportionment rule, and why the Constitution grants Congress broad taxing
powers that allow for a wealth tax, whether it is apportioned or not. The maximalist
interpretations misapprehend the role of apportionment in the constitutional structure,
and improperly elevate a peripheral rule into a major barrier to tax reform.
This brief explains why constitutional history and Supreme Court precedents instead
support a measured interpretation of the apportionment rule. This measured
interpretation preserves apportionment’s role in the constitutional structure—and does
not read the provision out of the Constitution—but also does not improperly inflate the

1

See, e.g., Howard Schneider & Chris Khan, Reuters, Majority of Americans favor wealth tax on very rich (Jan. 10, 2020),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-inequality-poll/majority-of-americans-favor-wealth-tax-on-very-richreuters-ipsos-poll-idUSKBN1Z9141.
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rule into a fundamental limitation to Congress’s taxing power. Under this interpretation,
the Constitution allows Congress to enact an unapportioned wealth tax but would still
require apportionment for some other forms of taxes, such as a tax on real estate alone.
This brief offers a descriptive analysis of the constitutional provisions and consequently
describes how any member of the Supreme Court should evaluate a federal wealth tax,
regardless of the member’s personal motives or policy preferences. Discussions of the
constitutionality of a wealth tax sometimes conflate this descriptive analysis—as to
what the Constitution in fact does and should require—with a predictive analysis of
how particular members of the current Supreme Court might rule. Although this brief
primarily offers a descriptive analysis of the constitutional provisions and what they
require, the final section addresses the separate question of whether Congress should
enact a wealth tax at a time when particular members of the Supreme Court may rely
upon maximalist arguments to strike it down.
A federal wealth tax warrants sustained and careful debate on the merits: how it should
be designed, how it will affect economic activity and tax revenues, and how it should
interact with other taxes. This important debate, however, should not be short-circuited
by reflexive arguments that a wealth tax would be unconstitutional. Rather, voters
and legislators should determine the scope and design of a federal wealth tax, as the
Constitution ultimately requires.

THE CONSTITUTION GRANTS CONGRESS A BROAD
TAXING POWER, WITH SOME LIMITATIONS
Understanding Congress’s taxing power under the Constitution begins with a
consideration of the tax provisions and their role in the constitutional structure. Article
I Section 8 Clause 1 provides Congress’s general taxing power: “The Congress shall have
Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide
for the common Defence [sic] and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties,
Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.”
This language grants Congress a broad general taxing power for a broad range of public
purposes.2 The provision only includes one explicit restriction: that such measures
must be imposed uniformly across the country. As described below, the courts have not
interpreted the uniformity requirement as a significant limitation to Congress’s taxing
power.
2

Article 1 Section 9 Clause 5 provides the only explicit constitutional limit on Congress’s taxing power: Congress cannot tax
state exports. Other constitutional restrictions that are beyond the scope of this brief, such as the Due Process Clause in
the Fifth Amendment, could also limit Congress’s taxing power in particular circumstances.
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One additional restriction appears at two other locations in the Constitution, which is
referred to as the “apportionment rule.” Article 1 Section 2 Clause 3 originally provided,
in the context of the structure of the House of Representatives, that “Representatives and
direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within
this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding
to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of
Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons.” Article 1 Section
9 Clause 4 similarly provides: “No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in
Proportion to the Census or enumeration herein before directed to be taken.”
The apportionment rule, when it applies, requires a tax to be imposed in each state,
proportional to that state’s population. This rule, by definition, treats taxpayers differently
based on their geographic location, and is therefore incompatible with the uniformity
requirement, which precludes such differential treatment. As a result, the uniformity
requirement and the apportionment rule are commonly understood to apply to different
forms of taxes, but not simultaneously to the same tax.3

THE MEASURED INTERPRETATION OF
THE APPORTIONMENT RULE AVOIDS THE
PROBLEMS WITH MAXIMALIST AND MINIMALIST
INTERPRETATIONS
Would a federal tax on an individual’s net wealth be a “direct tax” subject to
apportionment? This question cannot be answered with certainty since the scope of the
term “direct tax” is innately ambiguous and indeterminate. Scholars have acknowledged
the challenge of interpreting a “fuzzy historical record,”4 as even the delegates to the
constitutional convention did not share a common understanding of what taxes would
be subject to apportionment and in what circumstances.
As James Madison famously recounted, fellow delegate Rufus King asked for a precise
definition of the term “direct taxation,” but “no one answered.”5 This often-repeated
anecdote cautions against definitive claims as to exactly what taxes the term “direct taxes”

3

4

5

See Joseph M. Dodge, What Federal Taxes Are Subject to the Rule of Apportionment Under the Constitution?, 11 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 839, 856 (2009). (“The uniformity requirement is incompatible with apportionment, because apportionment . . .
must necessarily impose different tax rates with respect to different states.”).
Erik M. Jensen, The Apportionment of “Direct Taxes”: Are Consumption Taxes Constitutional?, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2334,
2414 (1997).
James Madison, IV, The Writings of James Madison, The Journal of the Constitutional Convention, Aug. 20, I787, at 252 (G.P.
Putnam’s Sons 1905).
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should include, or as to the delegate’s understanding of the term. More recently, in the
case of NFIB v. Sebelius, Chief Justice John Roberts observed that “even when the Direct Tax
Clause was written it was unclear what else, other than a capitation [tax] . . . might be a
direct tax.”6
The apportionment rule’s original purpose, its role within the constitutional structure,
and Supreme Court precedent all support a measured interpretation of the rule, as has
been advocated in the prior literature. A measured interpretation recognizes that the
apportionment rule is the product of an intentionally ambiguous compromise over
representation and slavery, with only a vestigial role today. As described later in this
brief, this measured interpretation would align the interpretation of the apportionment
rule with the interpretation of the uniformity requirement, which the Supreme Court
has interpreted narrowly, notwithstanding uniformity’s more central role in the
constitutional structure.
In contrast to this measured interpretation, maximalist interpretations of the
apportionment rule mistakenly interpret a provision arising from narrow and historically
contingent circumstances in order to override the Constitution’s unambiguous grant of
a broad taxing power to Congress. Minimalist interpretations, on the other hand, might
imply ignoring the rule altogether, and reading it out of the Constitution. In contrast to
both of these approaches, the measured interpretation would preserve the role of the
apportionment rule in the constitutional structure without inflating its significance and
subverting Congress’s taxing power.

The Origins of the Apportionment Rule Support Its
Narrow Application
The delegates originally added the apportionment rule to the Constitution in order to
reach agreement over the question of how enslaved persons should affect each state’s
representation in Congress. The question of how to allocate representation among
the states—and how to account for enslaved persons—threatened to derail the 1787
constitutional convention. The delegates adopted the apportionment rule as part of the
infamous “three-fifths compromise” granting Southern states partial representation with
respect to the enslaved persons in these states.
In the context of this debate, Gouverneur Morris of New York proposed the apportionment
rule for direct taxes, which he considered “a bridge . . . over a certain gulph” that could

6

National Federation of Independent Business v Sebelius (NFIB), 567 U.S. 519, 570 (2012).
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subsequently be removed.7 The apportionment rule for direct taxes assured Northern
delegates that any increased representation would be linked to a potential cost of higher
taxation, but also assured Southern delegates that this higher taxation would only apply
when Congress imposes direct taxes.8
Apportionment may also have appealed to Southern delegates for a more fundamental
reason: to prevent “emancipation by taxation.”9 Southern delegates feared that a federal
government with a broad taxing power could effectively end the institution of slavery by
imposing an unapportioned tax on enslaved persons.10 The apportionment rule in Article
1 Section 9 Clause 4 for capitation and other direct taxes ensured that Congress could not
impose a slave tax at a rate high enough to end slavery. For this reason, historian Robin
Einhorn argues that slavery and the three-fifths rule “lay at the heart of all discussion
about apportioned direct taxes” and that the apportionment rule was ultimately “a rule
about slavery.”11
The history of the apportionment rule and the reasons why the delegates added it to
the Constitution have implications for how it should be understood and interpreted.
Most importantly, the rule arose from a dispute over the institution of slavery and as
an integral part of the infamous three-fifths compromise over representation. The
three-fifths rule has now been superseded by the Fourteenth Amendment, leaving
apportionment as a vestigial byproduct of an obsolete law.12
The history of the apportionment rule also explains why the delegates would have
adopted a rule without a clear understanding of when exactly it would apply. Ambiguity
and uncertainty most likely served as advantages of the rule, so that the delegates could
reach a compromise.
This history also explains the peripheral role of the apportionment rule in the
constitutional structure. The delegates did not necessarily consider the apportionment
rule to reflect any fundamental view of fiscal policy or federalism,13 and consequently did
not include the provision in Article I Section 8 Clause 1—which granted Congress’s general
taxing power—as they did in the case of the uniformity requirement. Rather, the delegates
added the rule elsewhere in order to resolve the narrow question of representation and
slavery.

7
8
9
10
11
12
13

ROBIN L. EINHORN, AMERICAN TAXATION, AMERICAN SLAVERY 166 (2006).
EINHORN, supra; Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and the Constitution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 10 (1999).
Vanessa Williamson, National Tax Association 113th Annual Conference, Racism and Tax Policy Plenary, Nov. 20, 2020.
EINHORN, supra, at 161–62.
Id.
U.S. Const. Amend. XIV § 2; See Ackerman, supra, at 26-27.
Ackerman, supra, at 11.
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Early cases interpreted the apportionment rule and the direct tax definition narrowly,
in light of its contingent origins and peripheral role in the constitutional structure.
The early Supreme Court cases adopted a purely functional understanding of the
apportionment rule. In Hylton v. United States, for example, Justice Samuel Chase argued
that the apportionment rule was never intended to obstruct the federal taxing power, nor
to prevent Congress from levying any particular form of tax, and therefore apportionment
should only be required when it would be feasible or “could reasonably apply.”14
Subsequent cases generally followed the reasoning in Hylton and its narrow functional
understanding of the apportionment rule.15 For example, in Veazie v. Fenno the Court held
that the apportionment rule is not a “limitation of power” but merely prescribes “a mode
in which it shall be exercised.”16

Maximalist Interpretations Inflate the Significance of the
Apportionment Rule
Maximalist interpretations of the apportionment rule argue, to the contrary, that the rule
should serve as a major barrier to Congress’s taxing power, notwithstanding its peripheral
role in the constitutional structure. These arguments rely, alternatively, upon elements in
the historical record suggesting the rule should be interpreted broadly, or upon formalist
understandings of the rule’s operation regardless of its original meaning.
Proponents of a maximalist interpretation often rely upon the infamous 1895 Pollock
cases,17 in which the Supreme Court invalidated the Income Tax of 1894 and introduced
a more expansive interpretation of the apportionment rule as a substantive limit on
Congress’s taxing power. In the Pollock cases, the Supreme Court departed from its history
of judicial restraint and a broad interpretation of Congress’s constitutional taxing power.
The Court held that a tax on income is functionally equivalent to a tax on the property
generating the income, and a tax on such property would be a “direct tax” subject to
apportionment.
The Pollock rulings arrived at the dawn of the “Lochner Era,” when the Court repeatedly
struck down progressive measures through rulings limiting government regulation of

14
15

16
17

Hylton, 3 U.S. at 174 (opinion of Chase, J.).
See, e.g., Pacific Insurance Co v. Soule, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 433 (1868); Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533 (1869); United
States v. Singer, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 111 (1873); Scholey v. Rew, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 331 (1874); Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586
(1881).
Veazie, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 541.
Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Tr. Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895); Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Tr. Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
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economic activity.18 Many scholars consequently view the Pollock holdings as a case of
judicial overreach, where the Court departed from its own precedent and mistakenly
attributed undue significance to the apportionment rule in order to invalidate
democratically enacted legislation that threatened the interests of economic elites.19
The Court’s judicial overreach jeopardized the Court’s perceived legitimacy and caused
a public uproar that culminated in the enactment of the Sixteenth Amendment and a
dramatic expansion of the federal tax system only two decades later.20
The Supreme Court has also subsequently repudiated the core logic underlying the
holdings in Pollock, that a tax on income is equivalent to a tax on underlying property.21
Nonetheless, the case continues to serve as a lodestar for maximalist interpretations of
the apportionment rule. In NFIB v. Sebelius, Justice Roberts also cited approvingly Pollock’s
holding that apportionment would be required for a tax on real estate or personal
property.22
Two contemporary arguments for a maximalist interpretation of the apportionment
rule—that would preclude a federal wealth tax—draw from the Pollock Court’s maximalist
interpretation and narrow view of Congress’s taxing power. First, some argue that the
delegates shared a common view that certain taxes would be subject to apportionment,
even if they disagreed on the precise definition of a direct tax.23 For example, in the Hylton
case, Alexander Hamilton conceded that a tax on real estate would be a direct tax, even
as he advocated for a broad federal taxing power that would allow for a federal tax on
carriages at issue in the case.24 Some scholars also argue, based on some of the statements
in the historical record, that at least some delegates did consider the apportionment rule
to serve an important role in promoting federalism and fiscal restraint.25
Some offer a second justification for a maximalist interpretation of the apportionment
rule. Under this view the apportionment rule should endure as a formal restraint on the

18

19
20
21

22
23

24

25

BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND
SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 173–77 (2009).
See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 8.
FRIEDMAN, supra, at 173–91.
See South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 515–27 (1988) (overturning the Pollock holding that a tax on municipal bond
interest was an unconstitutional tax on the instrumentalities or property of a state); New York ex rel Cohn v. Graves, 300
U.S. 308, 314–16 (1937) (repudiating the Pollock logic equating a tax on income from property with a tax on the underlying
property).
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 567 U.S. 519, 571 (2012).
See Erik M. Jensen, The Constitution Matters in Taxation, 100 Tax Notes 821, 829 (2003); Daniel Hemel & Rebecca Kysar,
The Big Problem with Wealth Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/07/opinion/wealth-taxconstitution.html.
Alexander Hamilton, Brief for the United States, Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796), reprinted in 8 The Works of
Alexander Hamilton 378, 382 (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1904); Hemel & Kysar, supra.
See, e.g, Erik M. Jensen, The Taxing Power, the Sixteenth Amendment, and the Meaning of “Incomes,” 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1057,
1069-70 (2001).

CR E AT I V E C O M M O N S C O PYR I G H T 2 02 1

|

R O OSEV ELTI N STI TU TE.OR G

7

taxing power, irrespective of the rule’s original purpose. This argument follows from a
view that the constitutional provisions should be interpreted in a “robust form” so as to
afford them substantive effect.26 Professor Erik Jensen argues, for example, that “[W]e’re not
drafting a Constitution from scratch, and the apportionment rule is in the Constitution.”27
This view might imply that the apportionment rule should not be ignored or written out
of the Constitution, even if it only remains as a vestigial clause with an original function
that is no longer relevant.
The primary problem with maximalist interpretations based on the historical record
is simply that they tend to elide the apportionment rule’s ambiguous and contingent
origins described above, and the lack of a clear understanding among the delegates as to
when apportionment would be required. These accounts elevate a vague and tangential
provision reached in the context of a compromise over slavery and representation into a
defining element of the constitutional structure.
Furthermore, one also cannot draw conclusions as to the scope of apportionment based
on the delegates’ stated definitions of a direct tax, since their definitions of the term
depended upon their understanding of when apportionment would in fact be feasible.
For example, Alexander Hamilton’s interpretation of the direct tax definition reflects the
same functional understanding of the apportionment rule adopted by the Hylton Court,
and the same view that apportionment should only be required when feasible.28 In the
brief, he argued that the definition of the constitutional terms is uncertain, and “must
be fixed by a species of arbitration, and ought to be such as will involve neither absurdity
nor inconvenience.”29 That is, Hamilton thought a tax on real estate would be a direct tax
because he presumed Congress could in fact apportion such a tax.
As Ari Glogower argues, a maximalist interpretation of the apportionment rule would
also be inconsistent with Congress’s unambiguous taxing powers under the Constitution,
including its power to tax income under the Sixteenth Amendment.30 Instead of taxing
wealth separately, Congress could make adjustments to the income tax that would
replicate the economic effects of a wealth tax. These adjustments, however, could not
be disallowed without significantly narrowing Congress’s power to tax income under
the Sixteenth Amendment as it is currently understood. This fact makes it impossible to
reconcile a maximalist interpretation of the apportionment rule with the contemporary
understanding of Congress’s taxing power.
26
27
28

29
30

See Jensen, supra note 4, at 2380.
Jensen, supra note 25, at 1079.
Hamilton, supra note 24; see also Ari Glogower, Comparing Capital Income and Wealth Taxes, 48 PEPP. L. REV. __
(forthcoming 2021).
Hamilton, supra.
Ari Glogower, A Constitutional Wealth Tax, 118 MICH. L. REV. 717 (2020).
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For example, as an alternative to a net wealth tax, Congress could also tax wealth through
wealth-based adjustments to the income tax. Congress could disallow cost recovery
deductions, which would be economically equivalent to a wealth tax, or it could use a
taxpayer’s wealth as a factor in determining income tax liabilities.31 A broad reading of
the apportionment rule to invalidate these rules, since they indirectly tax wealth, could
destabilize settled doctrine defining Congress’s power to tax income under the Sixteenth
Amendment.
This alternative tax design illustrates how maximalist interpretations of the
apportionment rule could invite a more interventionist role for the Supreme Court
in overturning democratically enacted tax legislation, with no discernible limiting
principles that could preserve Congress’s essential taxing power. The maximalist
interpretation of the apportionment rule would essentially allow a peripheral and
ambiguous constitutional provision with a contingent role in the constitutional structure
to destabilize Congress’s unambiguous constitutional taxing powers.
The discussion in the following sections also describes additional problems with the
maximalist interpretations. First, even maximalist interpretations based on a formal
understanding of the apportionment rule’s role in the Constitution would not support
the conclusion that a wealth tax would be unconstitutional, since in that case Congress
could avoid a formal application of the apportionment rule for similarly formal reasons.
Maximalist interpretations based on the original understanding of the apportionment
rule might also render it impossible for Congress to implement a wealth tax at all—
whether apportioned or not—even though the apportionment rule is clearly not intended
to preclude Congress from implementing any particular form of tax. Finally, maximalist
interpretations of the apportionment rule are inconsistent with the Court’s narrow
interpretation of the uniformity requirement as a limit on Congress’s taxing power,
despite the fact that the uniformity requirement has an even more central role in the
constitutional structure.

Minimalist Interpretations Would Practically Eliminate the
Apportionment Rule
Scholars have also advocated for minimalist interpretations of the apportionment rule
as a vestigial and irrelevant provision, which could suggest reading the rule out of the
Constitution entirely or only applying it in very narrow circumstances.32 Professor Calvin
31
32

Glogower, supra, at 727-57.
Professors Bruce Ackerman and Calvin Johnson ultimately argue that the apportionment rule should be preserved and
should still apply in narrow circumstances. Their arguments, however, could be interpreted to imply an even narrower role
for apportionment.
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Johnson argues that the apportionment rule was a “glitch” or “foul-up” in the drafting
of the Constitution, with potential consequences that the delegates did not foresee.33 He
observes that the delegates may not even have understood how apportionment would
operate and why it would be inconsistent with the uniformity requirement, and that they
never intended it to preclude the federal government from implementing any particular
form of tax.34 Professor Bruce Ackerman similarly argues that, since the apportionment
rule served the narrow purpose of bridging a compromise over slavery, the rule has no
further relevance in the constitutional structure following slavery’s abolition.35
Johnson argues that, due to the vestigial nature of the apportionment clause,
apportionment should only be required for a tax when it would be “reasonable” or
“convenient.”36 This view may imply that apportionment would not even be required for
a tax on real estate or personal property, if it were unreasonable or inconvenient to do so
now. This functional approach to interpreting the apportionment rule reflects the same
reasoning in Hylton and the early case law: that the rule should only be applied when it
would be feasible for Congress to do so today.37
These minimalist interpretations of the apportionment rule accurately describe its
peripheral role in the constitutional structure and explain why it is arguably irrelevant
today. At the same time, proponents of these minimalist interpretations also argue that
the Court could still preserve a narrow role for apportionment, so as to not read the
provision out of the Constitution entirely.

The Measured Interpretation Preserves an Appropriate
Role for Apportionment
The Supreme Court would not need to read the apportionment rule out of the
Constitution entirely and could still preserve a role for the rule in the constitutional
structure in accordance with its original function. At the same time, the Court should also
not attribute undue significance to this peripheral rule and transform it into a major
barrier to Congress’s taxing power.

33

34

35

36
37

Calvin H. Johnson, Apportionment of Direct Taxes: The Foul-Up in the Core of the Constitution, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
1, 3 (1998).
For example, as Johnson notes, even James Madison thought that some forms of excise taxes could also be considered
direct taxes, subject to both uniformity and apportionment. Johnson, supra, at 66 (1998) (citing Letter from James Madison
to Alexander Hamilton (Nov. 19, 1789), in 12 The Papers of James Madison, 449 (Charles F. Hobson & Robert A. Rutland eds.,
1979)).
See Ackerman, supra note 8, at 51. Ackerman argues that this tainted origin of the apportionment rule explains why the
Court should not expand its role, even if the Court preserves a narrow role for the rule in the constitutional structure.
Johnson, supra, at 11.
As described above, however, the early Supreme Court cases presumed at the time that it would in fact be feasible to
apportion a tax on real estate, as Congress did on occasion during this period.
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Scholars have proposed a measured interpretation of the apportionment rule: to only
require apportionment for a tax on real estate located within each state—regardless
of how easy it would be for Congress to do so today—and not to require apportionment
for a broader tax on a broader measure of an individual’s net wealth.38 This measured
interpretation would preserve the Supreme Court precedent and most accurately reflect
the original understandings of the apportionment rule and its role in the constitutional
structure.
The measured interpretation reflects the area of broad agreement in the case law and
the scholarly literature. The Court has consistently held that a tax on real estate would be
a direct tax, even in the early cases reflecting the view that apportionment should only
be required when feasible. To the extent the delegates held any common understanding
of apportionment at all, the historical record does suggest a shared assumption that
apportionment would be required for a tax on real estate.
This measured interpretation is also consistent, however, with the logic underlying
maximalist interpretations of the apportionment rule. That is, even if the apportionment
rule is understood to require apportionment for real estate, and even if the rule should
be preserved as a formal constitutional constraint divorced from its original purpose,
neither of these considerations would necessarily preclude an unapportioned federal
wealth tax.
If the apportionment rule only persists as a formal constraint prohibiting a tax on
real estate, then Congress could avoid its application on similarly formal grounds, by
designing a wealth tax that avoids any possibility of falling within the formal definition
of a direct tax. For example, as Professor Ackerman argues, even if one assumes that the
Constitution would still require apportionment of a tax on real estate alone for purely
formal reasons, it should not also require apportionment for a broader wealth tax base
that includes real estate as one factor in the taxable base, but that is qualitatively different
from a tax on real estate alone.39 Throughout the early case law, the Supreme Court
followed this same approach: adopting formal distinctions to resolve formal constraints
in the constitutional provisions.40
Finally, as described in the following section, the measured interpretation avoids a
potentially illogical outcome in which a maximalist interpretation of the apportionment
38

39

40

See Ackerman, supra note 8, at 56 (arguing that apportionment should only be required for a tax on real estate); Dodge,
supra note 3, at 924 (arguing that apportionment should only be required for a tax on real estate or tangible personal
property).
Ackerman, supra; see also Dawn Johnsen & Walter Dellinger, The Constitutionality of a National Wealth Tax, 93 IND L.J.
111, 126 (2018).
See, e.g., the cases described supra note 15.

CR E AT I V E C O M M O N S C O PYR I G H T 2 02 1

|

R O OSEV ELTI N STI TU TE.OR G

11

rule could preclude Congress from implementing particular forms of tax entirely. The
measured interpretation avoids this difficulty by only requiring apportionment when it
would be unambiguously possible, at least in principle, for Congress to do so.

THE PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF
APPORTIONMENT ALSO SUPPORT THE MEASURED
INTERPRETATION
The apportionment rule does not expressly preclude Congress from levying any
particular form of tax. As a result, even proponents of maximalist interpretations
concede that apportionment would not be required when it would prevent Congress from
implementing a tax of any kind. In practice, apportioning a modern federal tax would be
innately impossible, possible in theory but unfeasible in practice, or at least complicated,
depending upon different views in the literature and different possible interpretations of
what exactly apportionment requires. This consideration provides additional support for
the measured interpretation, so that apportionment would not be required when it could
effectively prevent Congress from implementing a tax.
Apportionment could have the regressive effect of imposing a proportionally higher
burden on a relatively populous but poorer state. For example, assume a simple case of a
wealth tax apportioned between two states: State A, which is relatively rich, has one-third
of the total population and two-thirds of the total wealth, while State B, which is relatively
poorer, has two-thirds of the total population and one-third of the total wealth. Under
apportionment, the relatively poorer residents of State B would bear twice the total wealth
tax burden as would the richer residents of State A, notwithstanding the fact that the State
B residents only own half as much wealth as do the State A residents.41
These potential regressive effects of apportionment have long been understood as
sufficient reasons to conclude that the Constitution would not require apportionment
for taxes whenever their apportionment would result in this “great inequality and
injustice.”42 As expressed by Justice Chase, “If it is proposed to tax any specific article by the
rule of apportionment, and it would evidently create great inequality and injustice, it is
unreasonable to say that the Constitution intended such tax should be laid by that rule.”43
Based on this logic, the Hylton Court found that the tax at issue was therefore not a direct
tax.
41
42
43

See Hylton v. U.S. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 174 (1796) (opinion of Chase, J.).
Id. at 174 (Chase, J.); see also id. at 178–179 (Paterson, J.), 182 (Iredell, J.).
Id. at 174 (Chase, J.).
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Some scholars have recently proposed more complex systems that could enable Congress
to apportion a wealth tax while avoiding or at least mitigating these sorts of regressive
effects. For example, professors John Brooks and David Gamage argue that Congress
could apportion a comprehensive federal wealth tax in a manner similar to how the
1798 Direct Tax Act was apportioned—using a residual tax on land value to effectuate the
apportionment—and then use a “fiscal equalization” system to counteract the regressive
effects this would otherwise cause between wealthier and less wealthy states.44 Others
argue that this system would be unworkable in practice or that it would still not be
constitutional under a maximalist view of the apportionment rule.
It is also not entirely clear whether apportionment in accordance with the term’s original
understanding would be possible at all for a comprehensive wealth tax, including in
its base assets without any identifiable geographic location, such as intangible assets.
Professor Joseph Dodge argues that a wealth tax should be limited to a tax on real
estate alone, where apportionment based on the geographic location of the asset is in
principle feasible, but should not be required for a tax on intangibles with no identifiable
location.45
The 1798 Direct Tax Act and other early Direct Tax Acts did not apply to intangible
assets, so it is not known how or whether the delegates would have apportioned a tax
on intangibles. Arguably, the apportionment rule might be interpreted as requiring
apportionment based on the geographic location of the specific assets subject to the tax,
rather than the location of the taxpayer. This understanding is arguably consistent with
original practice, since in principle, tax administrators could identify the assets physically
located in each state.
For example, in the 1798 Direct Tax Act, Congress imposed a “direct tax” on real estate,
which was apportioned among the states by population, and then levied accordingly
on the property “within such state.”46 While it would be possible in principle for tax
administrators to identify the location of tangible assets and value them accordingly,47
intangible assets do not have an actual physical location and therefore would not be
apportionable under this understanding of the rule.48 Of course, Congress could always

44

45
46

47

48

John Brooks & David Gamage, Why A Wealth Tax is Definitely Constitutional (Jan. 9, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3489997&download=yes.
See Dodge, supra note 3, at 922–26.
An Act: To lay and collect a direct tax within the United States, ch. 75, § 2, 1 Stat. 597, 598 (1798). See also the description of
how apportionment was understood to operate in Hylton, 3 U.S. at 178–79.
Nicholas Parillo describes the enormous challenges in administering the 1798 apportioned tax on real estate. Nicholas R.
Parillo, A Critical Assessment of the Originalist Case Against Administrative Regulatory Power: New Evidence from the
Federal Tax on Private Real Estate in the 1790s, 130 YALE L. J. __ (forthcoming 2021).
See Dodge, supra, at 926-27.
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determine some method for apportioning intangibles, such as on a destination basis.
While there is a “well settled rule of domicile with respect to taxation” of treating “the situs
of intangible property as the owner’s domicile,”49 there are no Supreme Court precedents
on whether such an approach would satisfy the apportionment rule for a federal wealth
tax including intangibles in its base, in accordance with how the term was originally
understood to function.
Ultimately, scholars may disagree on whether it would be impossible, unfeasible, or just
complicated for Congress to apportion a wealth tax in the first instance or to mitigate any
unacceptably regressive effects. In the former cases, maximalist interpretations of the
apportionment rule could in effect become categorical restrictions on Congress’s ability to
implement certain forms of taxes, which was clearly not how the delegates intended for
apportionment to operate.

LESSONS FROM THE UNIFORMITY REQUIREMENT
Advocates for maximalist interpretations of constitutional limits on Congress’s taxing
power might have instead focused on a more appropriate target: the uniformity
requirement. Recall that the delegates included the uniformity requirement as the only
explicit limitation in Article 1 Section 2 Clause 8, which is the section granting Congress’s
general taxing power. As a result, the uniformity requirement might be understood as a
central restraint on this taxing power, and a more important one than the apportionment
rule which appears elsewhere in the constitutional structure.
The history of this provision over time, however, offers a lesson in how the requirements
in the constitutional structure need not be interpreted so as to impede the administration
of a modern taxing system. As such, it provides a counterexample to maximalist
interpretations of constitutional limits on Congress’s taxing power, and a precedent for
the measured interpretation of these provisions.
The delegates included the uniformity requirement in order to address central and
legitimate concerns: The requirement ensured that consistent rates and rules would
replace the patchwork of uncoordinated regional taxes that impeded trade at the time,
and that Congress could not use the taxing power to discriminate against specific states
or regions.50

49
50

Burton v New York State Dept. of Taxation & Fin. Court of Appeals of New York, 25 N.Y.3d 732 *; 37 N.E.3d 718 (2015).
DAVID HUTCHISON, THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION 99–101 (1975).
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Despite the uniformity requirement’s central role in the constitutional structure, however,
the Supreme Court has interpreted the requirement narrowly so as to diminish—and
virtually eliminate—its role as a restraint on the taxing power. The provision has been
referred to as an “empty shell” that has been practically written out of the Constitution.51
In early cases, the Court held that the uniformity requirement did not require “intrinsic
uniformity”—and therefore did not prevent Congress from treating taxpayers differently,
based on their income level or other personal attributes—but only required “geographic
uniformity” so that taxpayers are not treated differently based on where they live.52
In the modern era, the Court has held that the uniformity requirement would not even
bar tax rules that differentiate among taxpayers based on where they live. In the 1983 case
U.S. v. Ptasynski,53 the Supreme Court adopted a measured interpretation of the uniformity
requirement, which would preserve some role for the requirement and avoid reading it
out of the Constitution, but which would also avoid interpreting the requirement in a way
that would unduly constrain Congress’s taxing power. The Court held that the uniformity
requirement does not prohibit “geographically defined classifications” and suggested that
the uniformity requirement would only prohibit a law that reflected explicit “geographic
discrimination” without any other policy rationale.54 In effect, this holding preserved a
narrow role for the uniformity requirement, without interpreting the rule in a way that
would inhibit Congress’s basic exercise of its taxing power.
The story of the uniformity requirement, and its interpretation over time, illustrates
why it would be wrong to attribute maximalist interpretations to every limitation in the
Constitution’s tax provisions. Maximalist interpretations of the apportionment rule could
have exactly the effect the Court avoided in the case of the uniformity requirement, in
precluding Congress from imposing certain forms of taxes. The Supreme Court, however,
has correctly avoided such interpretations of the uniformity requirement in order to
preserve Congress’s basic taxing power.
The divergent approaches to the interpretation of the uniformity requirement and
the apportionment rule suggest a basic inconsistency in the interpretation of the
constitutional tax provisions: The same voices advocating for maximalist interpretations
of the apportionment rule—so as to preclude a federal wealth tax—apparently have
no objections to a minimalist interpretation of the even more important uniformity
requirement.

51
52
53
54

Nelson Lund, The Uniformity Clause, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1193, 1193 (1984).
See, e.g., Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 84–85 (1900).
462 U.S. 74 (1983)
462 U.S. 74, at 83–86.
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To avoid this inconsistency, the Court should similarly interpret the apportionment
rule so that it would be neither “absurdly strict” nor “completely empty.” By adopting the
measured interpretation, the Court could accede that the Constitution would require
apportionment for a tax on real estate alone, but not for a broader wealth tax base that
would be either impossible or extremely difficult to apportion in accordance with the
rule’s original understanding.

WHAT ABOUT THE CURRENT SUPREME COURT?
Of course, any particular justices on the Supreme Court at any particular moment in
history could find grounds to invalidate an unapportioned wealth tax, based on the
maximalist interpretations of the apportionment rule described above. Some current
Supreme Court members who have indicated a preference for shielding economic
interests from government intervention might be even more inclined to endorse these
arguments so as to justify striking down congressional exercises of the taxing power. We
do not believe, however, that a democratically elected Congress should legislate so as to
satisfy the political preferences of any particular justice. Rather, Congress should legislate
in accordance with its constitutionally prescribed powers.
The current Supreme Court may in fact strike down any number of desirable legislative
initiatives that Congress should nonetheless pursue. For example, in a recent speech,
Justice Samuel Alito expressed a range of policy preferences, including expanding gun
ownership rights and restricting government measures necessary to prevent the spread
of COVID-19.55 Similarly, in her confirmation hearing, Justice Amy Coney Barrett would not
confirm whether she believed Social Security and Medicare were constitutional.56
We don’t believe that Congress should legislate so as to anticipate such preferences, and
for the same reason, we don’t believe Congress should structure tax reform to satisfy
particular justices’ anticipated preferences regarding the structure of the tax system.
Congress’s primary responsibility is to make all laws “necessary and proper” according to
its constitutional powers, based on faithful interpretations of these powers.
Furthermore, it is critically important for scholars and policymakers to distinguish
between descriptive accounts of what the Constitution in fact allows, and predictive

55
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See Scott Lemieux, NBCNews.com, Supreme Court Justice Alito’s Federalist Society Speech Shows How Political the
Court Will Get (Nov. 13, 2020) https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/supreme-court-justice-alito-s-federalist-societyspeech-shows-how-ncna1247751.
See Nancy Altman, TheHill.com, Is Social Security Safe from the Courts? (Oct. 15, 2020) https://thehill.com/blogs/congressblog/judicial/521131-is-social-security-safe-from-the-courts.
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accounts of how it may be interpreted by any particular justices at a particular moment
in time. Some scholars have framed objections to a federal wealth tax by describing
possible arguments that a Court could rely upon to find it unconstitutional. Without
a clear distinction between the predictive and descriptive accounts, however, these
same arguments can be interpreted as positive claims as to how the Constitution
should be properly interpreted. More generally, we disagree with accounts in the
literature presuming or implying that a federal wealth tax would be unambiguously
unconstitutional while eliding ambiguous and historically contingent origins of the
constitutional taxing provisions summarized in this brief.
Finally, what if Congress expends political capital enacting a federal wealth tax only for
the Court to strike it down? One answer, which may not be entirely satisfactory, is to let
Congress do its job based on good-faith interpretations of its constitutional powers and to
then hope that the Court will execute its duties in good faith as well.
There can also be unexpected consequences if a Supreme Court subverts constitutional
and democratically enacted legislation with broad national support. For example,
in the 1895 Pollock cases, a reactionary Court motivated to insulate monied interests
from legislative intervention overturned the 1894 income tax, based on an ahistorical
interpretation of the constitutional provisions. As described above, this judicial overreach
jeopardized the Court’s perceived legitimacy and directly led to the enactment of the
Sixteenth Amendment and the expansion of the federal tax system soon after. Judicial
overreach in striking down a federal wealth tax today could lead to similar consequences
in the years to come.

CONCLUSION
Congress can exercise its broad taxing power under the Constitution to implement an
unapportioned federal wealth tax. Maximalist interpretations of the apportionment
rule—currently marshalled to support the claim that an unapportioned wealth tax would
be unconstitutional—overstate the rule’s original purpose and role in the constitutional
structure. By upholding an unapportioned wealth tax, the Supreme Court would also
follow its own precedent, by not interpreting the constitutional provisions in a manner
that subverts Congress’s essential taxing power.
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